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SURVEY
SURVEY: GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING: AN
ANALYSIS OF RECENT CASES
Jim Hubble
I. INTRODUCTION
The tort of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing has grown explosively in Montana. Montana courts initially im-
plied the covenant in relationships involving insurance companies
and their insured in the 1960s.1 Until the late 1970s, the courts
refused to imply the covenant out of that context. In the 1980s, the
courts have imposed the covenant in many relationships, not only
where one of the parties occupies a superior bargaining position,
but also where the parties are of relatively equal strengths.2
Business people, insurance companies, banks, and lawyers
complain that all of their actions are subject to such scrutiny by
customers, clients, employees, lawyers, courts, and juries that they
feel "damned if they do" and "damned if they don't." They fear
that there is no clear standard for good faith and fair dealing, and
therefore compliance is impossible.
This survey addresses the current status of the tort by review-
ing conduct that the Montana Supreme Court has found signifi-
cant in recent cases. The survey attempts to provide some guid-
ance to Montana lawyers on how to advise their clients to avoid
claims of bad faith and/or to spot significant facts in a client's case
that can support a claim for breach of the tort of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
To date, the Montana courts have found the covenant to exist
not only in the insurance context, but also in employment, bank-
ing, fee arrangements between lawyer and client, and recently in
commercial contracts between parties of relatively equal strength.3
Lawyers representing clients engaged in any of those activities
have the duty to inform their clients of the conduct that juries and
courts have found to support a claim of bad faith.
1. Jessen v. O'Daniel, 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mont. 1962).
2. Nicholson v. United Pac. Ins. Co., - Mont. -, 710 P.2d 1342, 1347 (1985).
3. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 1348.
1
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The Montana Supreme Court first implied the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in an employment relationship in Gates
v. Life of Montana Insurance Co.4 The court held that by failing
to follow its own written policies for discharging employees, the
employer had unjustly "shattered the peace of mind" of its em-
ployees and had violated the covenant.' In a second decision in the
same case, the court ruled that sufficiently culpable conduct on the
part of the employer will support a claim for punitive damages.'
The employer's culpable conduct included not following its written
policies, refusing to return a letter of resignation obtained under
duress, and not giving a positive employment reference that was
promised in exchange for the letter of resignation.'
In a subsequent case, Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing
Co.,8 the Montana Supreme Court held that proof of the em-
ployer's violation of a written policy was not necessary for a find-
ing of a breach of the covenant where an employee had reason to
believe that her job was secure.' This holding protected the invest-
ment of a worker in a job that she reasonably believed secure as
long as she performed satisfactorily. 0
In Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital," the court
found that the employer had breached the covenant by relying on
false charges that it should have investigated when it terminated
an employee. The employer later repeated those charges to the
state job service. In doing so, the employer deprived the employee
of employment in the local medical community and jeopardized
her career. 12
The court in Crenshaw also upheld the trial court's admission
of expert testimony concerning the hospital's breach of the cove-
nant." The expert testified that the hospital had committed nu-
merous errors and that the discharge was unjustified.' 4 The court
4. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982) (commonly referred to as Gates I).
5. Id. at 184, 638 P.2d at 1067.
6. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., - Mont. -, 668 P.2d 213, 215 (1983) (Gates
//).
7. Id.
8. - Mont. -, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984).
9. Id. at - , 687 P.2d at 1020.
10. Id.
11. - Mont. - , 693 P.2d 487 (1984).
12. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 492.
13. Id. at , 693 P.2d at 494-95.
14. Id. at , 693 P.2d at 493.
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found that "fault arising from breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is not easily comprehensible to the average
person."15
The court further held that it was not error for the trial court
to instruct the jury on negligence as a possible theory of recovery
in the case. 6 The court reasoned that by not interviewing all key
witnesses the hospital's conduct failed to meet the legal standard
of protecting the employee from unreasonable risk.'7 Unfortu-
nately, the court failed to clearly state whether negligence is an
issue in an action involving the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. However, the court ruled that the hospital's actions
amounted to more than "ordinary negligence" and that the evi-
dence supported the jury's award of damages.'
B. Flanigan-Recent Developments
The court affirmed its prior holdings in the most recent case
involving the covenant in an employment relationship: Flanigan v.
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association.9 In Flanigan,
the jury found that the employer's conduct was so outrageous as to
warrant an award of $1.3 million in exemplary damages, $94,000 in
economic damages, and $100,000 for emotional distress.20 The su-
preme court affirmed the award in a 4 to 3 decision.
Ms. Flanigan had worked for Prudential Savings and Loan in
Butte for 28 years. During that time she had performed a number
of jobs, all of them satisfactorily.2 ' During early 1980, the company
eliminated her position as an assistant loan counselor and re-
trained her as a teller.2 2 A few weeks later the company terminated
her employment without notice and without hearing.23 More than a
year later the company offered to reinstate her as a part-time
teller.2 4
As in Crenshaw, Ms. Flanigan introduced expert testimony.
The expert testified that the company had violated its own person-
nel policies regarding job security and job rights thirteen times
15. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 494.
16. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 493.
17. Id.
18. Id. at __, 693 P.2d at 495-96.
19. - Mont. -, 720 P.2d 257 (1986).
20. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 258.
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when it terminated Ms. Flanigan.2 5 The company failed to give Ms.
Flanigan notice, or a hearing, and failed to recall her to fill vacant
positions.
The court found that the testimony of company officials could
have indicated to the jury that the company had ulterior motives
for terminating Ms. Flanigan's employment.2 ' Her former supervi-
sor testified initially that Ms. Flanigan was terminated as part of a
reduction in force, unrelated to her job performance.28 However, he
changed his testimony later in the trial when he stated that she
was terminated on account of poor job performance. 9 The court
found that the lack of credibility of the supervisor's testimony may
well have caused the jury "not to believe [the company's] whole
case."
30
At the time of her termination, her supervisor told her that
she was "not making it as a teller" and that she was "vindictive" in
using her seniority to claim the month of August as her vacation
period."1 However, several months later the president of the com-
pany informed her that her termination was the result of a com-
pany-wide reduction in force and that her seniority and job per-
formance had no bearing on the decision to terminate her.2
Additionally, the company president's testimony indicated
that Ms. Flanigan's age was a prime reason for her termination. He
"referred to older employees as 'dead wood,' 'old dead wood,' and
'ballast.' He reiterated at the time of trial that he considered Mil-
dred Flanigan to be 'ballast.' " The court referred to his attitude
as "calloused. 3 4 "Implicit throughout the respondent's case [was]
the allegation that she was terminated because of her age and be-
cause of a desire on the part of the employer to cut costs associ-
ated with respondent's pension.""
The company gave her no warnings that her employment was
in jeopardy due to her job performance. 6 In fact, her supervisor
testified that her performance was not bad enough to warrant
25. Id. at -' 720 P.2d at 264.
26. Id. at ___ 720 P.2d at 259.
27. Id. at 720 P.2d at 262.
28. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 260.
29. Id.
30. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 262.
31. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 261.
32. Id.
33. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 265.
34. Id.








The court did not split over the issue of liability, but over the
amount of damages. The majority held that it would not substitute
its judgment for that of the jury even though the damages were
"large.""8 The majority discussed punitive damages in conjunction
with the company president's testimony regarding older employees
and reasoned that "[tihe jury could have inferred malice from the
lack of candor on the part of the [bank]." 3 9 The dissenters dis-
agreed only with the majority's opinion regarding the affirming of
the $1.3 million punitive damage award.40
Therefore, employers and their lawyers should not interpret
this case as being a close call on liability. They should look at the
facts of this case in light of their own policies and practices as they
apply to the termination of employment. The court agreed with
the jury that the employer had not dealt in good faith and fairly
with Mildred Flanigan when it terminated her after 28 years of
evidently satisfactory job performance without warning or notice
in violation of its own policies and for an evidently discriminatory
purpose.
In addition to its questionable handling of the termination,
the company subsequently changed its position relative to the rea-
son for termination on at least two occasions: once before and once
during the trial. To be even minimally credible, an employer has to
at least adopt and maintain the same position regarding actions
that affect its employees, particularly in the face of a lawsuit alleg-
ing wrongful termination.
Employers should establish systems to monitor and review
37. Id.
38. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 265.
39. Id. While this survey deals mainly with the conduct that the Montana Supreme
Court has found to constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, it also
includes some discussion of punitive damage awards. "Section 72-1-221, MCA provides for
punitive awards in cases of 'actual' malice and 'presumed' malice." Owens v. Parker Drilling
Co., - Mont. - , 676 P.2d 162, 163 (1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1985). In
Owens, the court adopted the following standard for "presumed" malice:
When a person knows or has reason to know of facts which create a high
degree of risk of harm to the substantial interests of another, and either deliber-
ately proceeds to act in conscious disregard of or indifference to that risk, or reck-
lessly proceeds in unreasonable disregard of or indifference to that risk, his con-
duct meets the standard of willful, wanton, and/or reckless to which the laws of
this State will allow imposition of punitive damages on the basis of presumed
malice.
Owens, __ Mont. at - , 676 P.2d at 164. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1985) _aNo de-
fines presumed malice, as well as actual malice, oppression, and fraud. It also provides that
juries may award exemplary or punitive damages upon finding oppression, fraud, actual
malice, or presumed malice. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1985).
40. Flanigan, - Mont. at - , 720 P.2d at 266-67 (Weber, J., dissenting).
1987]
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each termination decision to ensure compliance with the standards
of conduct established by the foregoing court decisions. Employers
must follow their own policies. Even if the employer does not have
such policies the courts will imply an obligation to have a "fair and
honest reason" to terminate an employee's services.1 With or
without written policies, employers should examine each termina-
tion decision to be sure that the termination is not motivated by
such ulterior reasons as vindictiveness or discrimination.
III. ATTORNEY CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS
A. Morse v. Espeland
Lawyers have a duty to act in their client's best interests. This
duty amounts to a fiduciary obligation.42 But when negotiating or
attempting to collect a fee from a client the fiduciary relationship
ceases to exist and the lawyer must operate at arm's length from
his client."
In Morse v. Espeland, the lawyer was representing his client
in a dissolution. 4 The client testified that, in their initial dealings,
the lawyer told her that his fee would be $5,000, or slightly higher
if the case became complicated. The attorney testified that they
had agreed on an hourly fee rate of $60. However, there was no
written agreement to confirm any fee arrangement.5
Eventually the client won a judgment for $667,555.75 in the
dissolution.4" The lawyer then told the client that his services
would be very expensive. When she reminded him of the $5,000
figure they had agreed on, he said, "I wouldn't dig ditches for
that. '4 The lawyer sued the client for his fee, expenses, and costs.
The client counterclaimed in constructive fraud, negligent breach
of fiduciary duty and deceit.48 The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the lawyer, but the supreme court reversed
that decision, finding that the client had alleged enough facts in
her counterclaim to make out a case for bad faith on the part of
the lawyer.49 The court allowed the client to amend her complaint
so that she could gain a recovery if she could prove what she had
41. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 262.
42. Morse v. Espeland, - Mont. -, 696 P.2d 428, 430 (1985).
43. Id.





49. Id. at , 696 P.2d at 430.
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alleged."
The court did not specifically set out what particular conduct
of the lawyer was objectionable. However, it appears that the fail-
ure to reduce the fee arrangement to writing, the failure to keep
accurate records of the work he performed, and his subsequent de-
mands and "ditch digging" comment were enough evidence to sup-
port a claim of bad faith. The implications are obvious for lawyers:
put fee arrangements in writing, keep records, and avoid making
unnecessary, insulting remarks to your clients.
IV. BANKING
A. Twombly-Good Faith Obligation
Banks owe their customers an obligation to deal with them
fairly and in good faith.5 1 The bank in First National Bank v.
Twombly,52 anticipating that it would be in a poor collateral posi-
tion, accelerated the balance on the Twomblys' note prior to its
due date, after promising that it would renegotiate the loan and
put it on an installment basis.58 The bank also used the Twomblys'
checking account balance to partially offset the delinquent loan,
without notifying the Twomblys." As a result, the Twomblys did
not have sufficient funds in their account and the bank dishonored
several checks.55 The bank's officers avoided talking to the Twom-
blys even though the Twomblys called and visited the bank to dis-
cuss the matter.50 The bank sued to recover the balance of the de-
linquent loan and the Twomblys counterclaimed, alleging that the
bank had breached its duty of good faith.5
The Twomblys won compensatory damages in a jury trial, but
the trial court refused to instruct the jury regarding punitive dam-
ages, holding that punitive damages were inappropriate in an ac-
tion on a contract.58 On appeal, the supreme court ruled that, be-
cause the breach of "the duty to exercise good faith . . . [was]
tortious," and if the bank's conduct was sufficiently culpable, the
jury could award punitive damages.5 9 The court remanded the case
50. Id. at __, 696 P.2d at 431.
51. See First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, - Mont. -, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (1984).
52. Id.
53. Id. at -, 689 P.2d at 1228.
54. Id. at __, 689 P.2d at 1229.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at -, 689 P.2d at 1227.
58. Id.
59. Id. at , 689 P.2d at 1230. 7
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to the district court for a trial on the issue of punitive damages
only.60
The court concluded that a jury could find all of the elements
necessary for a punitive damages award in the bank's conduct.
These elements included reckless disregard of the Twomblys'
rights amounting to malice, oppression in using the Twomblys'
checking account funds to offset the loan, and fraud in misrepre-
senting facts to the Twomblys 1
B. Tribby-Retaliation
In Tribby v. Northwestern Bank,6 2 the court implied the cove-
nant again and affirmed its holding in Twombly regarding punitive
damages. Tribby had an agreement with the bank that it would
not honor any of his partnership's checks unless both he and his
partner had signed them."' Subsequently, Tribby and his partner
agreed that either partner could sign checks, but they did not no-
tify the bank of this change.' However, at his partner's request
the bank issued new signature cards indicating that either partner
and Tribby's partner's wife could sign checks singly. The bank did
this without notifying Tribby or obtaining his authorization.6 5 The
bank honored checks without Tribby's signature. Tribby com-
plained and instructed the bank to discontinue this practice. When
he asked to see the signature card the bank initially informed him
that it was lost, but later showed him the card. This was his first
notice that new signature cards had been issued. The bank then
stopped honoring checks with only one signature.6
Tribby sued the bank for negligently issuing a new signature
card without notifying him. 7 The bank retaliated by cancelling his
overdraft account without notice, saying he was overextended
when the account was actually current. The bank also refused to
honor several items before notifying him that the bank had can-
celled the account.6 8 The bank further refused to renew a loan to
Tribby that it had renewed for several years. Additionally, the
bank affected his credit status by flagging one of his loans onto a
60. Id. at -, 689 P.2d at 1231.
61. Id. at -, 689 P.2d at 1230.
62. - Mont. -, 704 P.2d 409 (1985).












The court held that evidence of such "conduct might support
a finding of reckless disregard of Tribby's rights. 7 0 The court
ruled that the trial court had not erred when it issued instructions
to the jury to "consider recovery under tort principles and, accord-
ingly, punitive damages."7
C. Eystad-A Standard for Fairness?
In an even more recent case, Central Bank v. Eystad,2 the
supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that the bank had
not breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 3 The
evidence of the bank's candidness and reasonable treatment of the
Eystads, as well as the court's endorsement of the bank's conduct
may be taken as a standard of conduct that banks should adopt in
dealing with customers so as to avoid claims of bad faith dealings.
The bank gave the Eystads more than six month's notice of its
intention not to renew their loan unless the Eystads substantially
reduced the principal. The bank's officers were open and frank in
their discussions with the Eystads and when the Eystads failed to
reduce the principal, the bank gave them even more time to make
other arrangements before accelerating the balance. 4 Additionally,
the bank kept extensive records of its dealings with the Eystads
which tended to support its evidence of good faith dealing. 0
Central Bank's treatment of the Eystads was considerably dif-
ferent from the banks' dealings with their customers in Twombly
and Tribby. In those cases the banks were not forthright with the
customers, nor did they give advance notice of their actions affect-
ing the customers. Moreover, the banks seemed reluctant to dis-
cuss the matters in an open fashion with their customers. As a re-
sult, the court not only implied the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, it also held that punitive damages were appropriate recov-
eries for the plaintiff customers, based on the banks' "reckless dis-
regard" of their customers' rights from which a jury could infer
malice, oppression, or fraud. 6
69. Id.
70. Id. at -, 704 P.2d at 419.
71. Id.
72. - Mont. -, 710 P.2d 710 (1985).
73. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 714.
74. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 712.
75. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 713.
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V. CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
A. Nicholson-Implying the Covenant
In a far-reaching decision, Nicholson v. United Pacific Insur-
ance Co.," the Montana Supreme Court found that the covenant
existed in a contractual relationship where the parties were rela-
tively equal in bargaining strength. Nicholson, a developer and
contractor, and United Pacific agreed that Nicholson would re-
model certain office space to meet United Pacific's needs and that
United Pacific would then lease the space from Nicholson. The
parties further agreed that they would confer regarding the remod-
eling and that the final plans were subject to mutual approval.78
Problems arose very soon after the parties signed the agree-
ment. United Pacific criticized Nicholson's remodeling plans as in-
complete and Nicholson soon found it difficult to communicate
with anyone at United Pacific about the project. The day before
the project was to be completed, United Pacific notified Nicholson
that it was rescinding the lease agreement. 79 Nicholson's expenses
for the remodeling were in excess of $90,000 at that time.80 Nichol-
son subsequently notified United Pacific that it was in default and
filed a complaint, alleging among other things that United Pacific
had acted in bad faith toward him, and requested exemplary dam-
ages for United Pacific's breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.8 1
United Pacific maintained that Nicholson's shoddy work and
failure to meet specifications were justification for its rescission.82
However, during discovery Nicholson learned that United Pacific
was considering a reorganization that would have made the office
space unnecessary. Nicholson alleged that was the reason why
United Pacific became impossible to deal with.83 Nicholson pre-
vailed in a jury trial and won substantial compensatory and puni-
tive damages.8'
The supreme court upheld the judgment, reasoning that due
to their agreement both parties had an obligation to deal reasona-
bly with each other.8 5 The court held that unreasonable, capri-
77. - Mont. -, 710 P.2d 1342 (1985).
78. Id. at , 710 P.2d at 1344.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 1345.
82. Id.
83. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 1344.
84. Id. at , 710 P.2d at 1345.
85. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 1348.
202 [Vol. 48
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cious, or arbitrary conduct on the part of one of the parties will
subject that party to liability for compensatory damages because
such conduct was beyond the "justifiable expectations" of the
other party.8 6
The court thus imposed a "reasonable person" standard
against which to measure the conduct of parties to agreements.
The court stated that contract breaches, even intentional breaches
motivated by self-interest were to be expected and even en-
couraged. But the parties have "a justifiable expectation that the
other will act as a reasonable person. '87 When one of the parties
fails to act as a reasonable person, that party will be liable for
damages.88 The court found that United Pacific's conduct was un-
reasonable in that it arbitrarily refused to cooperate with Nichol-
son, making it impossible for him to perform and then rescinded
the agreement for his failure to perform.89
The court also affirmed the jury's award of punitive damages,
finding that United Pacific not only breached the agreement in bad
faith, but had done so in such a manner that a jury could find the
conduct amounted to "presumed malice." 0 While a breach of the
covenant will support a claim for compensatory damages, to re-
cover punitive damages the plaintiff has to prove malice, oppres-
sion, or fraud. 1
B. Thiel-Contract for Deed
In Thiel v. Johnson," the Montana Supreme Court affirmed
its holding in Nicholson." The court held that the plaintiffs had
acted unreasonably by waiving the time for payments on a contract
for deed and then by obtaining possession of the property from the
defendants under a court order prior to service of the required no-
tices of default and acceleration of payments." The court also
found that, prior to declaring default and moving to retake posses-
sion, the plaintiffs had unreasonably notified the utility companies
that they were going to take possession and that the defendants
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr.
389 (1978)).
88. Nicholson, - Mont. at -, 710 P.2d at 1348.
89. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 1346.
90. Id. at -, 710 P.2d at 1349 (citing Owens v. Parker Drilling Co., - Mont. at
-, 676 P.2d at 164).
91. Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1985); see supra note 40.
92. - Mont. -, 711 P.2d 829 (1985).
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could not pay their bills.9 5 While the jury awarded only actual
damages on the defendant's counterclaim alleging fraudulent and
malicious acts, 96 the court found that the conduct was such that it
supported the defendant's claim for "bad faith. '97
C. McGregor v. Mommer-"Honesty in Fact" Jury Instruction
Inadequate
In McGregor v. Mommer,98 the court again affirmed its hold-
ing in Nicholson and ruled that a jury instruction that good faith
means honesty in fact inadequately defined the tort. "The tort of
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
as defined in Nicholson, requires more than a lack of 'honesty in
fact.' "99 The court further held that the tort, as defined in Nichol-
son, requires at least arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable conduct
on the part of the defendants. 100 The court remanded the case for
retrial because of the inadequate jury instruction, overturning the
jury's award of damages for mental distress. 101
D. Bushnell v. Cook-Intentional Conduct Standard
The court seemingly set a standard requiring proof of inten-
tional conduct to support a claim for breach of the covenant in
Bushnell v. Cook.10 2 Bushnell involved a contract to purchase de-
velopment property. The court held that the trial court did not err
by refusing to give jury instructions on the breach of the covenant
because one defendant had no actual knowledge of any defect in
the land and the plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proof as
to "constructive fraud" against the other defendant.103 The court
ruled that the plaintiff would have had to prove intentional con-
cealment of the defect, in order to succeed in her claim of bad faith
and as she did not sustain her burden of proof on constructive
fraud an instruction on breach of the covenant "would have been
superfluous."1 0 4
The ruling in Bushnell provides an apparent answer to the
confusion engendered by the ambiguous ruling in Crenshaw v.
95. Id.
96. Id. at -, 711 P.2d at 831.
97. Id. at -, 711 P.2d at 833.
98. - Mont. -, 714 P.2d 536 (1986).
99. Id. at -, 714 P.2d at 543.
100. Id.
101. Id. at -, 714 P.2d at 545.
102. - Mont. -, 718 P.2d 665 (1986).
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Bozeman Deaconess Hospital"0 5 where the court failed to spell out
if simple negligence would support a claim of bad faith. 10 6 Of
course, Crenshaw was an employment case while Bushnell in-
volved a real estate contract, so practitioners cannot be certain
that the intentional conduct standard will apply out of that con-
text. However, the tort seems to resist classification. For example,
in a recent insurance case, Britton v. Farmers Insurance Group,
0 7
the court approved a Nicholson "unreasonable" behavior jury in-
struction on what constitutes bad faith. This survey reviews Brit-
ton in some detail in the succeeding section.
E. Dunfee -Breaching the Covenant Without Breaching the
Contract
In Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc.,0 8 the court implied the
covenant in a franchise agreement. Due to loss of sales and their
inability to continue operation of their franchise, the Dunfees re-
quested permission to relocate the franchise from a location for
which Baskin-Robbins had a fifteen-year lease. Baskin-Robbins
had the sole authority under the franchise agreement to determine
the location of the franchise.'09 Baskin-Robbins denied the request
and soon the Dunfees' franchise failed due to lack of adequate
sales volume." 0 The court held that Baskin-Robbins had breached
the covenant by: (1) not properly reviewing the Dunfees' request;
(2) not attempting to renegotiate the fifteen-year lease, even
though the lease was terminable after five years and Baskin-Rob-
bins had the right to sublet the property; and (3) not directing the
Dunfees' request to a company official who could approve it."'
As Baskin-Robbins had the full right under the contract to se-
lect franchise locations, they did not breach the contract by refus-
ing to grant the Dunfees' request to move." 2 Yet, Baskin-Robbins
breached the covenant because they did not act reasonably in con-
sidering "the facts regarding relocation," and because they did not
inform the Dunfees of the lease provisions so that the Dunfees
could locate another tenant." 3
The trial court instructed the jury on oppression, fraud, and
105. - Mont. -, 693 P.2d 487 (1984).
106. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 493.
107. - Mont. -' 721 P.2d 303, 317-18 (1986).
108. - Mont. -, 720 P.2d 1148 (1986).
109. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 1150.
110. Id.
111. Id. at , 720 P.2d at 1155.
112. Id. at , 720 P.2d at 1153.
113. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 1153-54.
1987]
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presumed malice as requirements for an award of punitive dam-
ages. 11 4 The Dunfees convinced the jury that Baskin-Robbins had
breached the covenant and had acted oppressively, fraudulently, or
with presumed malice. The supreme court upheld the jury's award
of punitive damages in its 4 to 3 majority opinion, finding that
while the facts presented it with a close question, there was suffi-
cient evidence in the record to support the verdict.'1 5 However, it
is not apparent from the opinion what conduct of Baskin-Robbins
was so egregious and culpable to warrant the "large" award. The
majority mentioned misrepresentation and a "vindictive atti-
tude,"116 but failed to discuss how either might support a punitive
damage award. As the dissent pointed out, there was also a lack of




In Jessen v. O'Daniel,1s the Montana Federal District Court
first implied the covenant in the insurance context as it related to
an insurer's failure to consider its insured's interests as well as its
own, resulting in a judgment against the insured in excess of his
liability coverage limit.1 9 Since Jessen, the Montana Supreme
Court has found that the covenant exists in cases involving the in-
surer's failure to pay benefits to an insured,1 20 and has allowed in-
jured parties to proceed directly against the tortfeasor's insurance
company when the insurance company failed to handle the claims
in good faith. 2 ' A 1984 Montana Law Review article provides an
excellent review of the growth of the tort in the insurance
context.' 2
114. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 1154-55.
115. Id. at , 720 P.2d at 1155.
116. Id.
117. Id. at -, 720 P.2d at 1156-57 (Weber, J., dissenting).
118. 210 F. Supp. 317.
119. Id.
120. Weber v. Blue Cross, - Mont. -, 643 P.2d 198 (1982).
121. Klaudt v. Flink, - Mont. - , 658 P.2d 1065 (1983).
122. Graham & Luck, The Continuing Development of the Tort of Bad Faith in Mon-
tana, 45 MONT. L. REv. 43 (1984). In addition to describing the history and state of the tort
in 1984, the article pointed out that the courts had not yet answered several questions.
Although the scope of this survey is to deal primarily with the issue of what sort of conduct
will support a claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the courts
have, in part, answered the questions posed by Graham and Luck. Obviously, the courts
have provided an affirmative answer to the question: "Will the courts find the covenant in
relationships outside of the insurance and employment contexts?"
[Vol. 48
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B. Conduct in the Insurance Context
1. Fode
The plaintiff in Fode v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 12  com-
plained that the defendant insurance company had wrongfully de-
nied any legal liability resulting from a traffic accident involving its
insured, the plaintiff, and a third party. The plaintiff alleged that
even though liability was clear the insurance company refused to
settle the claim.12 4 The district court granted summary judgment
for the insurance company in Fode's bad faith action. The supreme
court overruled, holding that Section 33-18-201 of Montana Code
Annotated created a duty in the insurer to deal fairly with third
party claimants. 1 25 The court further stated that a claimant does
The other question dealt primarily with the tort and its place in the insurance context.
The questions included: (a) whether the courts would affirm awards for mental distress in
an action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance
case; and (b) whether the courts would continue to allow plaintiffs to proceed against insur-
ance companies for breach of the covenant before the plaintiff had succeeded in establishing
the original tortfeasor's liability.
The answer to the first question concerning damages for mental distress came in Gibson
v. Western Fire Ins. Co., - Mont. -, 682 P.2d 725 (1984). In Gibson, the supreme
court upheld a jury's award of damages for mental distress suffered by an ophthalmologist
whose insurance company had breached the covenant by failing to settle in good faith a
malpractice claim against the doctor. Id. at -, 682 P.2d at 729. The trial in the underly-
ing action resulted in a verdict in excess of the doctor's policy limit. The doctor introduced
evidence of his mental distress in his bad faith action against his insurance company and
the court found no reason to overturn the jury's award of damages compensating the doctor
for that mental distress. Id. at -, 682 P.2d at 739.
There was no issue as to liability in Gibson, as the doctor and the insurer freely admit-
ted that the doctor had negligently caused the injury in the underlying case. However, the
insurance company seriously undervalued the case. It offered a settlement for far less than
juries had awarded in similar cases. The court concluded that this was the result of the
insurer not following established standards for investigation, evaluation, negotiation, and
communication with the insured. Id. at - , 682 P.2d at 736-37.
The court's decision in Fode v. Farmers Ins. Exch., - Mont. - , 719 P.2d 414
(1986), provided the answer to the second question. In a previous decision, Klaudt v, Flink,
Mont. - , 658 P.2d 1065 (1983), the court had held that a claimant in an action for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, could proceed against the insurance
company before establishing the original tortfeasor's liability. In Fode, the court reversed
that decision reasoning that a change in the procedure was necessary to balance the inter-
ests of both parties. Id. at -, 719 P.2d at 417. The court found that the Klaudt rule
"unfairly worked a prejudice to insurers" by exposing matters in the bad faith case that
would be otherwise protected by the attorney-client relationship in the underlying liability
case. Id.
Accordingly, the court ruled that there can be no further proceedings in a bad faith
action against an insurance company until settlement or judgment have resolved the liabil-
ity issues in the underlying case. Id. The court further held that while the claimant may file
a complaint to toll the statute of limitations, the parties may not engage in discovery. Id.
123. - Mont. -, 719 P.2d 414 (1986).
124. Id. at -' 719 P.2d at 415.
125. Id. at -, 719 P.2d at 416.
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not have to prove that liability is reasonably clear in order to
maintain an action in tort against the insurance company under
the statute.1 26 Rather, "[tihe 'reasonably clear' requirement is nec-
essary to show a violation of subsections 6 and 13127 of the statute,
but other provisions may also be violated and give rise to a cause
of action in tort. 12 8
2. Britton-New Standards
In Britton v. Farmers Insurance Group,1 29 the Montana Su-
preme Court gave further definition to an insurance company's
lawful duty to deal fairly and in good faith with an insured. The
court held that an insurance company cannot rely solely on evi-
dence that would be inadmissible in court to deny payment of a
claim. 130
In Britton, the insurance company relied on polygraph exami-
nations tending to implicate their insured in the arson of his prop-
erty.' The court ruled that results of the polygraph examinations
were inadmissible in the case.13 2 The court found that the insur-
ance company had also relied on other inadmissible evidence that
was irrelevant, rumor, and hearsay. 133 The court held that while an
insurance company can consider circumstantial evidence and rely
on that evidence to deny payment of a claim, the insurance com-
pany cannot rely solely on inadmissible evidence to refuse
payment. 134
The court stated that the principal determination in the case
was that such reliance was unreasonable and could not support the
company's refusal to pay the claim. " Thus, the court found that
the company unlawfully refused to pay the insured's claim. The
company thereby incurred claims for bad faith and unfair settle-
126. Id.
127. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201 (1985) provides that:
No person may, with such frequency as to indicate a general business prac-
tice, do any of the following:. . . (6) neglect to attempt in good faith to effectuate
prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become
reasonably clear. . .(3) fail to promptly settle claims, if liability has become rea-
sonably clear, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influ-
ence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
128. Fode, - Mont. at - , 719 P.2d at 416.
129. - Mont. -, 721 P.2d 303 (1986).
130. Id. at __, 721 P.2d at 306.
131. Id. at -, 721 P.2d at 313.
132. Id. at __, 721 P.2d at 315.
133. Id.
134. Id. at -, 721 P.2d at 317.
135. Id. at __, 721 P.2d at 306, 316.
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The court described in detail other unfair practices and viola-
tions of the covenant by the company that were sufficient by them-
selves for the trial court to submit the case to the jury for determi-
nation of extra-contractual damages and punitive damages. 36 This
conduct included: (1) creating an issue of total loss "to avoid the
application of the valued policy statute"; (2) failing to pay "the
stated value of the loss to the mortgagee bank"; (3) not negotiating
its payment to the bank with the insured as required by the terms
of the policy; (4) failing to deny coverage within a reasonable time
(here for nine months); (5) taking a partial assignment of the
bank's mortgage on the property, thereby not reducing the amount
owed on the property by the plaintiff, and precipitating the bank's
foreclosure action; (6) never raising the issue of arson directly with
the plaintiff until it filed its answer and cross claim in the bank's
foreclosure action; (7) claiming a subrogation right without first
denying the claim; and (8) wrongfully insisting that the plaintiff's
son was an insured under the policy.'37
Britton establishes an additional standard for insurance com-
panies to comply with in investigating claims: do not rely on evi-
dence that would be inadmissible in court to deny a claim. It fol-
lows then that insurance company claims managers and lawyers
must evaluate the information gathered in investigating claims to
ensure that they do not rely solely on evidence that would be inad-
missible in a trial.
3. Ellinghouse
In the recent case of Safeco Insurance Co. v. Ellinghouse,'38
the Montana Supreme Court examined the insurance company's
conduct in handling a third-party claim against its insured, finding
that the company's conduct was egregious. 3 9 In April 1980, Safeco
accepted coverage of a claim for wrongful death filed against El-
linghouse." 0 Safeco appointed a lawyer to represent Ellinghouse
and took charge of the defense of the claim.1' However, in August
1981, Safeco determined that there was no coverage under the pol-
icy." 2 Without notifying Ellinghouse of the determination of no
136. Id. at -, 721 P.2d at 317.
137. Id.
138. - Mont. -, 725 P.2d 217 (1986).
139. Id. at , 725 P.2d at 223.
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coverage and without consulting the lawyer handling the case,
Safeco obtained Ellinghouse's signature on a "no waiver" agree-
ment in October 1981.143 In November 1981, Safeco formally noti-
fied Ellinghouse that it denied coverage.1 4 Later, Ellinghouse set-
tled with the third party on his own, taking a mortgage on his
house to raise the funds to settle the case.145
Safeco filed a declaratory judgment action to determine cover-
age in September 1982. Ellinghouse counterclaimed in bad faith,
fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract, for actual and
punitive damages." 6 The trial court ruled that there was coverage
as a matter of law on the bases of waiver and estoppel. 147 The jury
awarded Ellinghouse $5 million in punitive damages, $200,000 in
damages for emotional distress, and $25,000 in economic
damages.148
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling that there
was coverage as a matter of law, holding that Safeco was estopped
from denying coverage eighteen months after it accepted cover-
age. "149 The court found that Safeco's home office had deliberately
ignored the general rule in an insurance estoppel case that once an
insurer has accepted coverage, without reservation of right, and
has assumed control of the defense, the insurer is estopped from
subsequently withdrawing and denying coverage.1 50 The court held
that the evidence proved that the company was well aware of the
rule, having been advised by its adjuster, an attorney, and its own
claims division supervisor that it had created estoppel by not im-
mediately notifying the insured of the coverage problem. 151
In addition to the disregarding of the rule of estoppel, the
court listed nine more examples of Safeco's egregious conduct. (1)
Safeco extracted the non-waiver agreement by deceit and later
used it against Ellinghouse in the declaratory judgment action. (2)
Safeco's acceptance of coverage and assertion of control denied El-
linghouse the opportunity to conduct his own early and indepen-
dent investigation of the case against him. (3) Safeco used El-
linghouse's deposition, given in the death case when he was
unaware of the coverage question, against him to support coverage
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at , 725 P.2d at 220.
146. Id. at -, 725 P.2d at 219.
147. Id. at -, 725 P.2d at 220.
148. Id. at , 725 P.2d at 219.
149. Id. at , 725 P.2d at 220.
150. Id. at -, 725 P.2d at 221.
151. Id. at -, 725 P.2d at 221, 222.
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denial. (4) For eighteen months, Safeco claimed exclusive control
of settlement under the policy, and then refused settlement offers
within the policy limits, but did not inform Ellinghouse of his per-
sonal risk or need for private counsel. (5) Safeco ordered the law-
yer representing it and Ellinghouse to cut back on discovery so as
not to incur any additional fees. The record does not indicate what
preparations were sacrificed because of this. (6) The lawyer that
Safeco appointed to represent Ellinghouse stated in June, 1981, he
would file a motion for summary judgment for Ellinghouse by early
November. Safeco denied on November 9, 1981, and the lawyer
never filed a motion for summary judgment. (7) Safeco never sent
a reservation of rights notice. Therefore, its denial surprised the
unsuspecting Ellinghouse so that he lost his chance to demand and
protect his rights. (8) Ellinghouse had to borrow $25,000 by mort-
gaging his house because Safeco failed in its legal duty. (9) Safeco's
claims division supervisor knew of the prejudice to Ellinghouse
very early in the handling of the case.152
Britton and Ellinghduse, the cases that preceded them, and
Montana's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act,153 establish
high standards of conduct for insurers. The lengthy lists of viola-
tions in Britton and Ellinghouse plus the holdings concerning the
issues of reliance on inadmissible evidence and estoppel should
provide insurance companies and their lawyers with a substantial
amount of information regarding the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and will help them avoid claims of bad faith.
VII. CONCLUSION
Insurers, employers, banks, parties to contracts, lawyers, and
the like customarily deal fairly and in good faith with their cus-
tomers, employees, clients, policy holders, and business associates.
That conduct is normally characterized by open, forthright com-
munication, reasonable, non-arbitrary and non-capricious behavior,
where the parties respect the objectives of the other and do not act
to deprive the other of the right to benefit from the relationship.
When the parties begin to act with ulterior motives and disre-
gard the rights of the other party, they open themselves up to
charges of bad faith dealing. As has been seen, such conduct will
not easily withstand the scrutiny of courts and jurors, and if the
plaintiff can prove that the defendant acted with malice, oppres-
sion, or fraud, the penalty may be very heavy.
152. Id. at -, 725 P.2d at 223, 224.
153. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201 (1985).
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